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Abstract 
 
There is a belief that the Chinese economy competes with the Latin-American ones for 
investment flows. Here we analyze the determinants of the US FDI outflows to the most 
representative Latin-American economies. We develop such assessment with a double-procedure 
cointegration analysis based on the time-series methodologies of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and 
Liu, Song and Romilly (1997). The results suggest that long-run investment to the Latin-
American region mainly depends on the performance of the US economy. Furthermore, they 
suggest the existence of a substitution effect between the Latin American countries and China for 
US investment flows. 
 
Resumen 
 
Existe una creencia de que la economía china compite con las latinoamericanas por flujos de 
inversión. Aquí analizamos los determinantes de los flujos de IED de EEUU a las economías 
latinoamericanas más representativas. Desarrollamos dicha evaluación con un análisis de 
procedimiento doble de cointegración basado en las metodologías de series de tiempo de Toda y 
Yamamoto (1995) y Liu, Song y Romilly (1997). Los resultados sugieren que la inversión de 
largo plazo en la región latinoamericana depende, primordialmente, del desempeño de la 
economía estadounidense. Además, los resultados sugieren la existencia de un efecto de 
sustitución de flujos de inversión de EEUU entre los países latinoamericanos y China. 
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COMPETITION BETWEEN LATIN AMERICA AND CHINA FOR US DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been increasing at an extraordinary speed during the last 
twenty years. In the second half of the last decade, world inflows grew at an annual rate of almost 
40 percent. For third consecutive year, global FDI inflows rose in 2006 – by 38% – to reach 
$1,306 billion (UNCTAD, 2007a). The largest inflows among developing economies went to 
China, Hong Kong (China) and Singapore. It is expected that the region will become even more 
attractive to efficiency-seeking FDI, as countries such as China and India plan to significantly 
improve their infrastructure. In UNCTAD’s World Investment Prospects Survey, more than 63% 
of the responding transnational corporations (TNCs) expressed optimism that FDI flows would 
increase over the period 2007-2009. According to the survey, the most attractive FDI destination 
countries are China and India, while East, South and South-East Asia is considered the most 
attractive region (UNCTAD, 2007b). 
 
China has been the world´s fastest-growing economy for the last twenty five years. Since 
the start of the economic reform process in 1978, the economy has shown an average real growth 
rate of 9.4 percent per year, according to official statistics. One of the most important elements of 
China’s economic reform has been the promotion of foreign direct investment inflows. When 
China initiated its ‘open-door’ policy, the amounts of FDI flows were very small. It was not until 
the mid-1980s that FDI in China surged and marked the beginning of China’s ride on the wave of 
globalization.1 In the early 1990s, it once again gained momentum. In 2002, despite the 
widespread decline in FDI in the world, China experienced an increase in FDI inflows and 
overtook the United States to become the world’s second largest destination of FDI. 
 
While increases in FDI from the outside world are complementary to China's efforts to 
modernize its economy, many developing countries seem to be worried about the prospect of a 
rising China that absorbs more and more of the investment from major multinationals. Several 
governments in Latin America have publicly noted that the emergence of China has diverted 
direct investment away from their economies.2 Policymakers and analysts in the developing 
world are convinced that the rise of China has contributed to the “hollowing out” phenomenon, 
with foreign and domestic investors leaving their countries and investing in China instead. This 
in turn has led to continued loss of manufacturing industries and jobs, undermining the vitality of 
these economies.3 
                                                 
1 China opened up Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the southeast part of China in an attempt to attract foreign 
capital from its neighbors. Four SEZs were established in two southeast coastal provinces, Guangdong and Fujian. In 
Guangdong province, three SEZs are established in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou. The main Chinese strategy is to 
attract capital-intensive industries via an export-manufacturing framework that uses special economic zones. 
2 Further econometric analyses are required to address this question (see, for example, Eichengreen and Tong 2005; 
Olarreaga, Lederman, and Cravino 2007; Garcia Herrero and Santabárbara 2005; and Chantassasawat et al. 2004).  
3It is important to mention that the continued growth of China also has some positive effects on Latin America. In 
first place, it means a bigger market. In the last few years, prices of commodities and raw materials such as copper, 
aluminum, cement, steel, petroleum and soybeans have soared partly due to the breakneck pace of China's 
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It is not hard to find analysts, commentators and policymakers in Latin America who have 
voiced concerns about the emergence of China, claiming that China is adversely affecting direct 
investment flows into their economies. Cesar Gaviria, head of the 34-country Organization of 
American States, was quoted to have said, "The fear of China is floating in the atmosphere here. 
It has become a challenge to the Americas not only because of cheap labor, but also on the skilled 
labor, technological and foreign investment front." Panama's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Nivia Rossana Casrellen, said, "The FTAA is moving ahead because of a collective will to speed 
up development and a collective fear of China" (Miami Herald November 21, 2003). According 
to Business Week's Mexico City Bureau Chief, Geri Smith, "China has siphoned precious 
investment and jobs from Mexico…" (Business Week, November 8, 2004).4 
 
Lora (2005) attempts to provide a comparison between China and Latin America based on 
the main variables that are closely associated with growth, and/or the ability of countries to 
attract foreign direct investment. His study argues that China’s strengths in relation to Latin 
America derive from the size of the economy, the country’s macroeconomic stability, the 
abundance of low-cost labor, the rapid expansion of its physical infrastructure, and its ability to 
innovate.5 China’s main weaknesses are a by-product of the lack of separation between market 
and state. This situation derives in poor corporate governance practices, a fragile financial system 
and a tendency to misallocate savings (which are manifested through excess of investments in 
many sectors). 
 
What makes China an outstanding case, according to the competitiveness indicator6, is the 
stability of its macroeconomic environment. China ranks seventh in the world according to this 
indicator, outperforming the typical country of any region of the world, including many 
developed countries. The Latin American countries analyzed in this study, in contrast, rank 
between 35 (Mexico) and 126 (Brazil)7, revealing that Latin America, in macroeconomic terms, 
is one of the most unstable regions in the world. (WEF, 2008).  
 
Olearreaga et al. (2007) find that China accumulated larger stocks of FDI than Latin 
America from 1990 to 1996, but not since 1997. However, this was not the case for U.S. capital 
invested in the manufacturing sectors of host countries, as stocks in China grew faster than in 
most Latin American countries between 1997 and 2003. Conventional wisdom also suggests that 
US TNCs are moving cutting edge R&D to China, in order to take advantage of low cost 
technologically skilled workers. But a study by Branstetter and Foley (2007) suggests that the 
above is not true. This conclusion is based on a comprehensive survey of the activities of US 
                                                                                                                                                              
industrialization. This seems to have benefited countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela as China became 
one of their largest export markets. (IDB, 2006). Mexico’s export products are similar to those of China, which is 
why it is likely to face a greater challenge. Secondly, the growing FDI outflows from China are also important. In 
2004, 50 per cent of Chinese FDI went towards Latin American (more than the 30 per cent than went towards Asia) 
(Lall, Albaladejo and Mesquita, 2004).  
4 More references are in Olarreaga et al (2007) 
5 For a comparison of factor endowments and export structures in China and Latin America see Schott (2004). For a 
comparison of transportation costs and their role in export competitiveness see Hummels (2004). 
6 The best-known international competitiveness indicator is the Growth Competitiveness Index published annually 
by the World Economic Forum. See WEF (2008)  
7 The country with best performance in Latin America is Chile with rank 12, the next in the region is Mexico with 
rank 35. 
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multinationals in China. The authors argue that the US firms account for a small component of 
total FDI inflows into China. US affiliates have contributed very little to Chinese fixed asset 
investment or employment growth.8 Moreover, in 2004 the Chinese operations of US firms 
accounted for only 1.9% of total foreign affiliate sales and 0.7% of total foreign affiliate assets. 
These small numbers reflect China’s poverty, its distance from the US market, and, to a lesser 
extent, its imperfect institutions (Ibid.).  
 
The above overview of facts, opinions and studies shows the importance of further 
research regarding possible effects of growing FDI inflows to China on the investment 
traditionally received by Latin America. In this article, we examine empirically whether recent 
FDI to China have influenced the main traditional destinations of the US foreign direct 
investment in the region. Specifically, we focus on a group of representative Latin American 
economies. These are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, and Venezuela. Particularly, 
for the case of Mexico, we develop a simulation exercise to assess the impact that an increase of 
the US investment flows to China may have on the Mexican economy.   
 
The organization of this article is as follows. After this brief background discussion, in the 
section 2, present the methodology and the empirical model. In section 3, we present and discuss 
our results. Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. Methodology 
 
In recent years, VAR and VECM methodologies have been used to test causal relationships 
among financial and economic variables. A pioneering application of these methodologies is that 
of McMillin (1988), which was was developed to analyze the effects of monetary shocks on 
business cycles. Other applications are found in Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Sims (1992), and 
Johansen (1998). Such applications were used to describe the effects and channels of monetary 
transmission in developed economies. More recent applications are those of Nielsen (2002) and 
Awokuse (2003). The latter studies were used to analyze the Danish exports and to validate the 
export-lead growth hypothesis for the Canadian economy.  
 
The application of these methodologies in the Latin American context is relatively rare. 
Recently, Abugri (2008) has used them to analyze the interactions between financial markets and 
macroeconomic performance in four Latin American economies. Other country-specific 
applications have focused on the Mexican economy. Among these applications those of Cuadros 
(2000) and De la Cruz and Nuñez (2006) are particularly relevant. The former analyzes the 
relationship between savings and growth determinants, while the latter focuses on the long-run 
relationship between FDI and the growth of the Mexican economy.  
 
Here we attempt to provide confirmatory evidence about the role of China in the Latin 
American region by using two time series methodologies. The first is that proposed by Gunduz 
and Hatemi-J (2005), which has two relevant aspects: 1) the application of the information 
criterion introduced by Hatemi-J (2003) to determine the optimal lag order in a vector 
                                                 
8 See Branstetter and Foley (2007).  
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autoregressive model (VAR)9; and 2) the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure to build a VAR 
by levels. 10 The second methodology is that of Liu, Song and Romilly (1997), which is used to 
test the existence of causal relationships between integrated series exists by employing a vector 
error correction (VECM) with the Hatemi-J lag’s test to estimate the correct VAR’s order.  
 
The VECM analysis procedure used in this article was originally applied by Liu, Song 
and Romilly (1997), Chandana and Basu (2002) and Liu, Burridge, y Sinclair (2002). This 
methodology allows us to study causality among non-stationary time-series that have long-run 
relationships. The analysis is based on the construction of a VECM that allows us to understand 
causality in a multivariate framework. In order to achieve this goal, we first verify the existence 
and number of unit roots by applying the Dickey-Fuller test (1979). Once the integration order is 
established, the second step consists in the application of the Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
cointegration test, by means of which we can build the VECM using maximum likelihood 
techniques to a VAR model assuming that the errors are Gaussian.  
 
The VECM allows us to study both weak causality and bidirectionality through the 
application of zero constraints over the adjustment factors and the lags of the variables included 
in the vector. In the latter case, the procedure allows us to establish, variable per variable, the 
existence of Granger causality and the direction of it (see Appendix A). With the VECM we also 
have the possibility to test for weak exogeneity. If the long-run relationship is significant enough 
to explain the evolution of the endogenous variables, and if uni or bidirectional causalities really 
exist between variables, both can be estimated. Finally, because all the variables used are 
expressed as logarithms, the VECM shows the relationships in terms of growth rates, and, by 
extension, it can be established how the evolution of investment in one country affects the 
dynamic of others. 
As said, the first step includes the construction of the vector error correction models 
(VECM models); to do this, we use transformed stationary time series (see Appendix B).11 
Furthermore, the selection of the optimal number of lags of the dependent variable depends on an 
Akaike criterion. The use of this criterion in addition to the Johansen-Joselius procedure allows 
us to prove the existence of cointegration (i.e. long-run relationships) among the variables.  
 
VECM models allow us to study the interrelations of Latin-American economies with 
themselves and with the US economy. We use one VECM model (VEC 1), to study the 
                                                 
9 Statistically, testing the existence of some log-run relationship requires a pth-order structural and dynamic VAR 
model. For this purpose, it is important to consider the choice of the optimal lag order (p).  Here the number of lags 
selected depends on the new Hatemi-J´s (2003) information criterion. Such criterion allows us to find the optimal lag 
order when the variables contain stochastic trends.  Then we use the Johansen and Juselius (1990) procedure to find 
the number and to estimate the cointegrated relationships.    
10 The Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure guarantees that the asymptotical distribution theory can be applied. 
Basically, the authors propose an augmented VAR (p+d) model for testing causality, if the variables are integrated (p 
is the VAR’s lag order and d is the integrations order of the variables).  
Consequently, the following VAR (p), in levels, is used: 
                           tptptt yAyAvy ε+++= −− ...11                                               (1) 
Where:  
ν  is a vector of intercepts, ty  is the number of variables [I (d)] and ε is the vector of errors terms (See Appendix 
A).  
11 The time series transformation was justified by the showing that all variables were I(1). 
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relationships between investment flows to Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. We then use 
a second VECM model (VEC 2) to study the relationships between investment flows to Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico. In both vectors we include the Gross Domestic Product of United States 
(US GDP) as an exogenous variable, in order to capture the influence of the American business 
cycle on the amounts that the US invests beyond its borders. 
 
The final step of the procedure involves the construction of two additional VECM models 
to focus on the interrelations between Latin America and China. Specifically, we include FDI 
flows from the US to China as an exogenous variable in the VECM models described earlier. We 
do this to focus on the possible impact of investment flows to China on Latin America and vice 
versa. Furthermore, we study the effects of a shock in US estment flows to China on the Mexican 
economy by developing an impulse-response analysis, applying the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
procedure. Finally, a VAR (p+d) is built to prove the robustness of the results. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
We assess the determinants of the US investment flows to some of the most representative Latin 
American economies. In particular, we evaluate the interrelations that these economies have with 
each other, with the US and with the China. This assessment is based on the double step-
procedure described earlier. The data used are yearly figures for the period 1966-2006, and were 
obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
 
 
3.1. US-Latin America Relationships 
 
We begin by exploring the correlations between the economic performance of US and the 
amounts of US investment in the Latin American economies. Our analysis shows that there is a 
strong correlation between the economic growth of United States and its investment abroad (See 
Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
FDI Correlation 
 
 Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela US GDP 
Argentina 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.85 
Brazil 0.95 1.00 0.92 0.77 0.85 0.80 0.94 
Chile 0.95 0.92 1.00 0.798 0.90 0.90 0.90 
Colombia 0.85 0.77 0.79 1.00 0.69 0.81 0.88 
Mexico 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.69 1.00 0.94 0.88 
Venezuela 0.87 0.80 0.90 0.81 0.94 1.00 0.75 
US GDP 0.85 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.88 0.75 1.00 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis  
 
Statistically, this correlation analysis can only be considered a first approximation of the 
relationships between the health of US economy and US investment flows to the Latin American 
countries. However, simple correlations do not allow us to establish causality nor the existence of 
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close relationships between each Latin-American country and US, nor between  the Latin-
American countries themselves.  It is necessary to use Granger causality techniques in order to 
clarify such relationships.  
 
As we have mentioned, the data are organized in two samples. The first of these allows us 
to construct the first vector error correction model: VECM 1. Statistical tests on VECM 1 suggest 
us that significant (5 percent) weak exogeneity exists for all the variables (see Appendix D). This 
finding implies that, in the sample of countries included in each VECM, the information and 
evolution of US FDI in every two Latin-American countries and the GDP of US allow us to 
understand the dynamics of US FDI in every third Latin-American country. Thus US FDI in each 
country is conditioned by the American business cycle, and by investment flows into other Latin-
American countries.  
 
The existence of weak exogeneity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
purposes of the economic analysis. Thus, even though, as a whole, the information provided by 
this set of the variables allows us to explain US investment in each particular Latin American 
country, we need to analyze the role of historical information. This information, captured by the 
lags of each VECM, allows us to explain the individual trends of US investment in each country 
of the Latin American region. Using this procedure, it is possible to explain statistically how the 
lagged variables influence other dependent variables, and to determine whether causality is uni or 
bidirectional.   
 
Statistical tests show that in all the cases where causality is observed in VEC 1, the 
causality test is positive (see Appendix E). US GDP seems to be the main explanatory variable of 
investment flows to the Latin-American countries. Looking at our results in more detail, it 
becomes apparent that investment flows to Brazil depend on lags in investment in other South 
American countries and on US GDP. It also seems that the closest relationships for Venezuela are 
with the flows of investment to Brazil and the state of the US economy. Furthermore it seems that 
bidirectional causality exists between Argentina and Brazil and also between Brazil and 
Venezuela. Such bidirectional causalities suggest that there are long-run economic 
interrelationships among these countries. Interestingly US investment in Mexico seems to depend 
only on US economic performance.  
 
We analyze the cases of Chile, Colombia and Mexico with a second VECM: VECM 2. 
This vector confirms that the observed causality between US economic performance and 
investment flows to Latin America is positive and that the performance of the US economy is the 
main explainanation of such flows. Thus, US investment in Chile, Colombia and Mexico are 
explained by the US GDP. This result means that long-run investment to the Latin American 
region mainly depends on the economic situation prevailing in the US economy; this is 
particularly true for the Mexican economy. Such conclusion is supported with empirical evidence 
that shows there are close ties between employment and production in both countries (see Graph 
3). Moreover, this conclusion is reinforced by the fact that 90 percent of Mexican exports go to 
US markets.  
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Graph 3 
The Economies of United States and Mexico 
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, FED and INEGI.  
   
3.2 US– Latin America –China Relationships 
In the second phase of our study, we include the US investment flows to China as a new variable 
in each of the previous data samples and VECM vectors. As in the previous analysis, the 
estimations show that weak exogeneity prevails in VECM 1 and VECM 2 (see Appendix F). 
Significant (5 percent) weak exogeneity exists for all the variables in both vectors. Therefore our 
previous interpretation can be extended to include China. Thus US FDI in each analyzed country 
is conditioned to the business cycle of the American economy and by the performance of other 
Latin American and Asian countries.  
 
Econometrically, it is interesting to point out that the statistical analysis of causality 
shows that a negative unidirectional relationship exists from China to most Latin-American 
countries (See Appendix G). Specifically, according to the sample of countries included in 
VECM 1, this relationship exists with respect to Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. In the sample of 
countries included in VECM 2, such relationship also is found with respect to Mexico. These 
findings, in addition to the previous ones, suggest the existence of competition between the Latin 
American countries and China for US investment flows.  Indeed, the analyses based on the 
methodology of Toda and Yamamoto (1995), confirm the previous results. The causality tests 
show the same negative causal relationships from China to the most important Latin American 
countries (See Appendix F). 
 
We believe that the explanation of these econometric findings lies at least in part on the 
existence of manufacturing export competition between China and the Latin American 
economies. Chinese manufacturing exports to the rest of the world have increased 
extraordinarily, and China has become the second leading exporter to the US, including such 
items as electronics, computers and electrical equipment. Exports and FDI are closely related in 
emerging economies [see, among others, Kung (2004) and De la Cruz and Nuñez (2006)]. We 
believe that our findings regarding the determinants of investment flows to Latin America can be 
explained in terms of this relationship and the existence of competition between Latin America 
and China.  
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Historically, Asian and Latin American economies used to export different goods, but 
now the situation is different. According to García-Herrero and Santabárbara (2005), a type of 
FDI substitution effect occurs among export-oriented emerging economies. Such substitution 
effect occurs when the economies produce the same goods and compete in the same markets. 
Thus, according to this idea, a rise in FDI inflows in an emerging economy, like the Chinese, can 
reduce investment flows to other, similar ones. We believe that some Latin American economies 
are experiencing this type of substitution effect, especially the exporters of manufactured goods, 
such as Brazil and Mexico.  
 
The FDI substitution effects between the Chinese and Latin American economies may 
have a negative impact on the economic performance of the latter. Here we assess this impact for 
the Mexican economy with an impulse-response analysis (see Graph 4). According to the 
impulse-response function, a change in US investment in China reduces the corresponding 
amount in Mexico. This prediction is consistent with the fact that some substitution of 
manufactured exports has occurred in recent years. Mexican economic growth shows a positive 
relationship with FDI and exports (see De la Cruz and Nuñez, 2006). Thus our assessment 
provides some support to those who claim that an increase in Chinese manufacturing sectors may 
have negative growth effects on the Latin American economy.    
 
 
Graph 4. 
Response of Mexico to China 
 
 
 
 
Our evidence suggests the existence of competition and substitution for FDI exists 
between China and some Latin American economies. However, we must recognize that China 
does not necessarily reduce FDI flows to the region. In recent years, Chinese investment flows to 
Latin America have increased. Usually such investment focuses on primary sectors, mainly into 
the production of commodities [see Rosales and Kuwayama, 2007]. In addition, the Chinese 
economy also demands the oil, copper and steel produced in the region. Such requirements 
explain the direct associations of China with economies like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
or Venezuela. Furthermore, these allow us to understand why some of those economies do not 
experience the FDI substitution effect.  
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4. Conclusions and comments 
 
The Chinese development strategy to entice foreign firms into investing in the country has been a 
huge success. This strategy depended on a mix of external and domestic policies. The Chinese 
"open door" external policies are complementary to those that internally seek the privatization of 
the economy. But is China diverting foreign direct investment away from the Latin American 
economies? This is the paramount question on the mind of many academic researchers as well as 
policymakers in Latin America. 
 
Here we have explored this question by using a time series study based on causality tests. 
The econometric outcomes suggest that long-run investment inflows to the Latin America region 
mainly depend on the economic situation prevailing in US economy and the specific relationships 
that each Latin American economy has with other economies of the region. Furthermore, the 
outcomes also suggest that there is competition between the Chinese and the Latin American 
economies for US foreign investment. FDI substitution effects may occur as consequence. Thus, 
at least for some economies of the region, increases in US FDI flows to China may reduce US 
investment in Latin America and, eventually, the economic growth perspectives of the region.  
 
We have derived such conclusions by applying two different methodologies for different 
country-data samples. According to our estimations, US FDI in each country is conditioned to the 
business cycle of the American economy. Our estimations also suggest that competition for FDI 
exists between emerging economies. Specifically they suggest that Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela 
compete (have a negative causal relationship) with China. Moreover, they suggest that the 
causation of such flows goes from China to Latin America. In addition, on the basis of an 
impulse-response analysis, we have provided evidence to support the claim that an increase in the 
production of Chinese manufactures may have negative growth effects to the Latin-American 
economies.  
 
  The Mexican economy deserves special attention in our analysis, since it is very likely 
that Mexico will be the country most affected by FDI competition and FDI substitution effects. 
De la Cruz, Gonzalez and Canfield (2008) show that the economic performance of Mexico relies 
mainly on its industrial and foreign trade sectors. Moreover, US investment flows to this 
economy are almost completely oriented to these sectors. Thus, overall, the behavior of FDI 
inflows is essential for the Mexican economy and its performance. Consequently, any change in 
the US economy may have a double-impact in this emerging economy through changes in 
exports and FDI inflows. In this context, FDI competition may be particularly stressful because 
US investment inflows do not seem to depend on the Mexican economy.  
 
This study can be extended in several directions. Further exploration into the determinants 
of US FDI flows to the Latin-American economies may include variables like exports, imports, 
domestic investment and employment. In fact, wider economic frameworks seem to be necessary 
to improve our understanding. In addition, the role of government policies must be analyzed. 
Since the nineties, economic reforms associated to privatization, financial and trade liberalization 
may have an important role to explain the financial flows in the Latin American region. Finally a 
third extension of this research has to do with the analysis of Chinese FDI outflows to the Latin 
American region, the understanding of which is necessary for the assessment of the net effects of 
the Chinese economy on Latin America. 
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Finally, we think that the impact of the Chinese economy on the Latin American region 
has been unnecessarily overestimated. Financial competition is important, but the Chinese 
economy per se is not the most important determinant of the flows of foreign direct investment 
into Latin America. Indeed, we believe that the reorganization of domestic conditions must play a 
bigger role in encouraging investment inflows. Such conditions may include regulation of 
markets, fostering of adequate corporate and fiscal practices, and liberalization reforms. 
However, we should not dismiss the notion that  Chinese competition may force the emerging 
economies of Latin America to improve their productive sectors and to defend their position in 
the international capital markets.  
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APPENDIXES 
 
Appendix A. Causality Methodology  
 
a) VAR(p+d) 
 
In the Toda and Yamamoto proposal, the causal relationship test does not include additional lags, 
i.e., d. Gunduz and Hatemi-J (2005) define the Toda and Yamamoto test statistic in a compact 
way, 
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             ),......,(
^
1
^^
Tεεδ = (n × T) 
t
^
ε  is defined as the estimated error term. Toda and Yamamoto introduced a modified Wald 
(MWALD) statistic for testing the null hypothesis of non-Granger causality.  
According to Gunduz and Hatemi-J (2005), the MWALD test is defined as: 
                                          
                                  [ ] )())´(()´( ^1´1^ ββ CCSZZCCMWALD u −− ⊗= ~ 2pχ                         (2) 
Where C is a (p × n(1+n(p+d))) selection matrix. That indicates whether a parameter has a zero 
value as the null hypothesis of non-Granger causality implies. Su is the estimated variance-
covariance matrix of residuals in Equation 1. β =vec(D) where vec means the column-staking 
operator 
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b) VECM(p) 
 
Without loss of generality, assume the existente of an autorregressive vector of p  order 
(VAR(p)) (Quintos, 1998). 
                                               ttt yLJy ε+= −
*
1
* )(                                                   (3) 
                                                1
1
)( −
=
∑= i
k
i
JLLJ                                                          (4) 
Where   *ty  is integrated of order one (I (1)). The corresponding VEC vector is 
                                                tttkt yyLJy ε+Π+∆=∆ −−
*
1
*
1
** )(                                 (5) 
                                                    1*
1
1
* )( −
−
∑= ii
k
k LJLJ                                             (6) 
                                                       ∑
+=
−=
k
il
li JJ
1
*                                                  (7) 
with 
                                                   ))1(( IJ −=∏                                                  (8) 
 
If there are q cointegration relationships, the matrix ∏  can be written as 
                                                 βα ′=Π                                                  (9) 
From equation 9, it can be established that the short and long-run significance of the parameters 
can be studied,  βij  y αij  respectively. Weak exogeneity can be studied by using zero constraints 
on αij. In the case of bidirectional causalita, Wald tests are applied on the lags of each variable 
included in the VEC (Liu, Burridge y Sinclair, 2002). 
 
 
Appendix B. Unit root  test 
 
VARIABLE 
 
ADF CRITICAL VALUE SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL 
 (%) 
VALUE 
Argentina -1.95 5 1.35 
Brazil 
 
-1.95 
 
5 
  
1.29 
Chile -1.95 5 -0.53 
China -1.95 5 1.02 
Colombia -1.95 5 -0.49 
Mexico -1.95 5     2.84 
Venezuela -1.95 5 3.59 
United States -1.95 5 1.13 
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Appendix C. Cointegration test 
VECM 1: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, United States and Venezuela. 
 Cointegration Rank Test  
Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace 5 % 1 % 
No. de CE(s)   Critical Value Critical Value 
None**  0.973400   148.3964  62.99  70.05 
One**  0.694013  80.97977  42.44  48.45 
        Two      0.434595  23.00230  25.32  30.45 
Three   0.163011  1.936102  12.25  16.26 
Tour 0.034965 1.020344    8.94  12.94 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level 
 
VECM 2: Chile, Colombia, Mexico, United States 
Cointegration Rank Test  
Hipótesis Eigenvalue Trace 5 % 1 % 
No. de CE(s)   Critical Value Critical Value 
None**  0.659304  67.48396  46.18  59.75 
One**  0.294955  39.78295  30.47  38.23 
        Two      0.103485  7.295066  14.93  22.23 
Three   0.010737  0.193574   3.69   5.38 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level 
 
 
Appendix D. Weak exogeneity results  
VECM 1  
Country P-value 
Argentina 0.0312 
Brazil 0.0011 
México 0.0275 
Venezuela 0.0021 
United States 0.0000 
 
VECM 2  
Country P-
value 
Chile 0.0131 
Colombia 0.0002 
Mexico 0.0101 
 United  
States 
0.0003 
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Appendix E. Granger causality 
 
VECM 1 
Simple: 1966 2006 
Dependent variable: D(LOG(ARGENTINA)) 
Independent Df Prob. 
D(LOG(BRAZIL)) 4 0.0130 
D(LOG(MEXICO)) 4 0.6293 
D(LOG(USPIB)) 4 0.0385 
D(LOG(VENEZUELA))   4 0.7193 
All  16         0.3113 
Dependent variable: D(LOG(BRAZIL)) 
Independent df Prob. 
D(LOG(ARGENTINA)) 4 0.0000 
D(LOG(MEXICO)) 4 0.1492 
D(LOG(USPIB)) 4 0.0183 
D(LOG(VENEZUELA)) 4 0.0505 
All   16  0.0603 
Dependent variable: D(LOG(MEXICO)) 
Independent df Prob. 
D(LOG(ARGENTINA)) 4            0.1823  
D(LOG(BRAZIL)) 4            0.0451 
D(LOG(USPIB))      4            0.0190 
D(LOG(VENEZUELA))        4            0.2691   
All   16  0.1537 
Dependent variable: D(LOG(VENEZUELA)) 
Independent df Prob. 
D(LOG(ARGENTINA)) 4 0.0501 
D(LOG(BRAZIL)) 4 0.0000 
D(LOG(MEXICO)) 4 0.0398 
D(LOG(USPIB)) 4 0.0271 
All 16 0.0182 
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VECM 2 
Sample: 1966 2006 
Dependent variable: D(LOG(CHILE)) 
Independent Df Prob. 
D(LOG(COLOMBIA)) 3            0.0915  
D(LOG(MEXICO)) 3            0.3891 
D(LOG(USPIB))    3         0.0259 
All    9         0.2162 
Dependent variable: D(LOG(COLOMBIA)) 
Independent df Prob. 
D(LOG(CHILE)) 3            0.1538  
D(LOG(MEXICO)) 3            0.5529 
D(LOG(USPIB))     3            0.0419 
All     9  0.3791 
Dependent variable: D(LOG(MEXICO)) 
Independent df Prob. 
D(LOG(CHILE)) 3            0.6129  
D(LOG(COLOMBIA)) 3            0.1872 
D(LOG(USPIB))     3            0.0001 
All     9 0.3010 
 
 
VEC 1  
Causality direction Sign 
Brazil→ Argentina 
United States → Argentina 
Argentina→ Brazil 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
United States → Brazil Positive 
Venezuela → Brazil 
Brazil→ Mexico 
Positive 
Positive 
United States →Mexico Positive 
Argentina→Venezuela Positive 
Brazil→Venezuela Positive 
Mexico→Venezuela Positive 
United States→Venezuela Positive 
 
 
VEC 2 
Causality direction Sign 
United States → Chile Positive 
United States →Colombia Positive 
United States→Mexico Positive 
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Appendix F. Weak exogeneity results when China is included. 
 
VECM 1  
País P-value 
Argentina 0.0101 
Brazil 0.0000 
México 0.0491 
Venezuela 0.0170 
United States 0.0016 
China 0.0371 
  
VECM 2  
Country P-value 
Chile 0.0219 
Colombia 0.0312 
Mexico 0.0501 
United States 0.0210 
China 0.0032 
 
 
Appendix G. Chinese causality effects over the Latin American countries. 
 
VECM 1  
Country P-value 
Argentina 0.0938 
Brazil  0.0451 
Mexico 0.0315 
Venezuela  0.0373 
 
VECM 2  
Country P-value 
Chile  0.3129 
Colombia 0.2844 
Mexico  0.0113 
 
 
 
Causality direction 
  
VECM 1 
Direction Sign 
China →Brazil Negative 
China→Mexico Negative 
China →Venezuela Negative 
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VECM 2 
Direction Sign 
China →Mexico Negative 
 
 
Appendix F. Toda and Yamamoto´s causality results  
 
VAR 1  
 
Direction Sign 
China →Brazil Negative 
China→Mexico Negative 
China →Venezuela Negative 
 
VAR(2) 
Direction Sign 
China →Mexico  Negative 
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